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THE “STEPPE WAR” (ON THE EXAMPLE OF THE NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENT OF KAZAKHS LED BY SARZHAN AND KENESARY KASYMOVS)

Abstract

This article deals with the problems of the steppe war during the national liberation movement of the Kazakh people under the leadership of Sultan Sarzhan and Khan Kenesary Kasymov (1824-1847). The author considers the term "steppe war", and its semantic meaning and peculiarities. Also on the example of military art of the Kazakh people in the first half of the XIX century, the specificity of steppe warfare and features of military art are studied. The territory of the Middle Juz became the main area of military operations during the period of the Kazakh people's intervention against the tsarist troops for the restoration of their independence. Through the experience of the Steppe War, it is possible to trace the main events that took place during the years of the protest movement of the legendary grandsons of Abylai Khan primarily on the territory of the Middle Juz. These are steppe territories, which were characterized by the lack of natural shelters in the form of forests and mountains.

Key words: steppe war, military history, Sarzhan, Kenesary, Cossacks, national liberation movements.

Introduction

The study of the experience of the steppe war in the Kazakh steppes of the first half of the XIX century can be attributed to the number of poorly studied problems. Many historical studies have data on armament, equipment and number of military groups, peculiarities of military art. However, the problem of the experience of the steppe war in the period of the first half of the XIX century was not the subject of a special scientific study.

Also, this period is characterized by the absence of not only natural-geographical factors, but also socio-economic factors, such as production plants, and industrial facilities. Through the study of this topic, it is also possible to consider some issues of military tactics, and armament of Kazakhs. As it is known, all national liberation movements of the Kazakh people were suppressed by force of military weapons. This force was the Cossacks. For example, Orenburg and Ural Cossacks were widely used against popular uprisings in the Younger Juz. In suppressing the rebellion of Sarzhan and Kenesary Kasymovs, the main punitive force was the Siberian Cossacks, and the weapons of the Orenburg Cossacks were also used. The paper shows the main events of military clashes between rebels and punishers in the period from 1824 to 1847 in chronological sequence.

Materials and methods of research

The relevance of the research topic is due to many factors. The XXI century puts forward new requirements for the evaluation of the military history of military art. Today, in the context of increasing military conflicts in the world, the study of the evolution of military equipment and military tactics requires further in-depth study. These issues are also of great importance for the actualization of the issues of the development of the military organization, ensuring military security.

When working on the study we used general scientific methods, such as analysis and synthesis, and logical methods. The main methods of research were also methods of systematization, generalization, induction, and deduction. The methodological basis of the research is the principles of historicism, objectivity, and unity of national and universal values. When working on the article the main concepts and provisions applied in the works of researchers

who contributed to the development of the methodological basis of research and evaluation of the problems of the history of the Kazakh region in the first half of the XIX century were used. To study the issue related to the study of the history of steppe warfare, military art, were also used methods of describing the natural and geographical features of the Kazakh region, the peculiarities of military art and its development; complex-system analysis, and analogy.

Results and its discussion

In historical, historic-military works of the modern period, there is no interpretation of the term "steppe war", which takes a central role in the history of military art of most nomadic nations. Military encyclopedias and encyclopedic dictionaries give historical types and classifications of different wars. For example, there are such concepts as "trade war" "preventive war", "holy war", "cold war", "hybrid war, and "nuclear war".

A certain chronological period is characterized by certain types and kinds of wars. Wars of antiquity, wars of conquest, when the capture of territory was an attempt to expand the borders of the attacking state, or dynastic. In modern times these are colonial, civil, cold, and World Wars.

At the same time, we should note that the concept of "steppe war" is found in the XIX century. Its detailed description is given in the book "Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences". This work was edited by the honored professor of military sciences of the Nikolaev Academy of General Staff Lieutenant General Heinrich Antonovich Leer. The description of the Steppe War is given by the military author in detail. In our opinion, it sufficiently reflects its meaning and therefore there is no need to revise it. The steppe war is a war in which the geographical factor plays a major role. As Leer himself notes, in steppe war, military actions take place in the so-called open territories. These are lands where there are practically no ecological systems, namely forests, mountains, and water resources. Such regions are also characterized by the absence of a developed economic sphere, more precisely, productive forces – factories, plants, mines, and industrial enterprises [1].

In the first half of the XIX century, the Kazakh steppe was not yet widely drawn into the influence of the Russian capital and was not under the influence of capitalist relations. In the steppe zone of the Middle Juz, the traditional economy of the Kazakh people, the basis of which was the extensive nomadic economy, was predominantly preserved. Most of the territories of the Middle and Younger Juzes of Kazakhstan met the criteria of steppe war.

The open Kazakh steppe could be accessible in military terms for campaigns of small detachments, which needed to carry with them all the provisions and weapons, as well as to know the exact duration of the military campaign. Therefore, the tsarist troops tried to take these features into account when confronting the Kazakh steppe.

The experience of the steppe war can be traced back to the example of the national liberation movement of Sultans Sarzhan and Kenesary Kasymov, grandsons of Abylai Khan. Their protest in total lasted almost a quarter of a century, namely 23 years from 1824 to 1847. During this period, the punitive Cossacks failed to capture either Sarzhan or Kenesary. Both Kazakh sultans fell from the treachery of neighboring enemies. Sarzhan died in 1836 at the hands of Kokand kushbek, and Kenesary – in 1847 at the hands of Kyrgyz traitors.

By the time of the national liberation uprising of the Kazakh people under the leadership of Sarzhan and Kenesara, the military art of the steppes had reached a good level of development, allowing the nomads to repel the onslaught of professionally trained and armed with the latest technology Cossack detachments. According to the researcher Zhumadil A.K., the issue of the military art of Kenesary Kasymov is well-developed in the domestic historiography [2]. The author presents a good historiographical review of both pre-revolutionary studies and works of the Soviet period and the present.

The weapons of nomadic Kazakhs were cold. It can be divided into three main types. The first is a striking weapon, which includes mace, club, and whip. The second type is stabbing, which

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includes saber, and sword (spades and spears). The third type – cutting and stabbing and cutting weapons are axes, swords, daggers, and knives [3].

Steppe warriors used different types in the structure of their military armament according to the degree of their applicability. Thus, the main type was a weapon of long distance, which included a bow and arrows [4]. Weapons of the middle distance were spears [5].

Historian A.K.Kushkumbaev notes that by the middle of the XIX century bows and arrows were almost out of use and had become a rarity.

Spears were indispensable weapons of cavalry. During mounted hand-to-hand combat, spears were the weapon of first strike.

Battle axes and knives, which were among the personal weapons of Kazakhs, were indispensable weapons of close combat. This type of weapon was a very important part of the weapon complex of Kazakh nomads of the late Middle Ages and early New Age [6]. Saber – is also a widespread type of personal weapon of the Kazakh warrior.

Also, many authors, including A. Levshin report the presence of such kinds of weapons as battle axe – shakan [7].

In the steppe conditions, the most difficult for the pursuers in the fight against the rebels were the natural and geographical factors. They often neglected the military art of the nomads, considering them to be poorly organized, not disciplined, poorly armed, and untrained in military affairs.

This factor became the key to the fact that the Cossacks paid special attention to climatic conditions in their struggle with nomads. Thus, the 19th-century edition of the Encyclopedia of Military and Naval Sciences explained that in steppe war, only the confrontation with nature took an important place. The battle with the enemy was not given such an essential significance. For the author of this work, it was considered an easy matter, as it was not very difficult due to such factors as weak discipline, backward armament, lack of military training, and low organization.

Thus, as can be seen from Leer's work, experts in the field of military affairs of the Russian Empire did not recognize the Kazakhs as worthy opponents, devaluing their military art.

However, in reality, the situation was quite different. The experience of the steppe war in Kazakhstan on the example of the armed protests of the Kazakh people under the leadership of Sarzhan and Kenesara Kasymovs shows that punitive expeditions often failed to achieve the main goal and returned with nothing.

Cossack detachments, which were sent to the steppe to catch rebellious sultans, had experienced leaders. Atamans of high ranks, who previously had practical experience in fighting the protests of nomadic peoples, were appointed to this position. They skillfully applied a variety of tactics and represented a formidable military force.

When forming military Cossack detachments, the reason for their assignment was first of all taken into account. As a rule, there were four of them. Among the first, could be reconnaissance, i.e. preliminary inspection of the area, determination of the enemy's forces, visual acquaintance with his capabilities. Secondly, Cossack detachments were assigned to the steppe to search for and return unruly Kazakh auls after the introduction of new administrative and territorial orders. Thirdly, they could be sent on military expeditions against rebels. Fourthly, Cossack detachments could be sent to establish a fortress and occupy some important strategic points in the Kazakh steppe.

These factors determined the specifics of the tsarist detachments' manning. First of all, it affected the size of the Cossack formation. Secondly, based on the purpose of the military, the army was supplied with ammunition, weapons, and provisions.

The detachments of Cossacks aimed at catching rebel leaders and punishing the latter clearly demonstrate the peculiarities of steppe war. The Cossacks improve specific techniques of fighting against nomadic rebels. They would later use this experience in suppressing the rebellions of the second half of the XIX century, as well as in 1916.

The history of the revolt of the masses led by the Kasymov sultans includes a large number of detachments of Cossacks who were sent by the government to the steppe to fight against them. Military campaigns were planned mainly for two periods, spring and fall. In spring – in April, in fall – from September to November. The main reasons for this were such natural-geographical reasons as the availability of sufficient water and fodder for horses, and favorable weather conditions for open-air accommodation. However, accommodation in the steppe, where there were no residential buildings, or mountains, forests, etc., made Cossack units vulnerable, as it increased the threat of attack by nomads.

During the whole period of the national liberation movement of Sultans Sarzhan and Kenesary Kasymov from 1824 to 1847, the Tsarist administration sent a large number of punitive detachments. There is a lot of information about this both in published materials of the early XX century and in archival sources. For example, quite valuable and unique material is presented in the works of the military, Major-General A.G. Serebrennikov [8].

Here are some major military clashes between rebels and their punishers in the period from 1824 to 1847:

1. 1825 – Karbyshev's punitive expedition, which included 200 Cossacks [9].

Cossack officer G. Katanaev would later mark the Cossacks' campaign as a feat. However, its outcome was tragic for the steppe men. Nevertheless, Sarzhan's rebellion did not stop [10].

2. 1827, September – a well-armed punitive detachment of 500 Cossacks with 2 guns of horse artillery came to pursue the people of the Baibur tribe from Semiyarskaya village [11]. The brutal massacre of them stopped the uprising for sometime, which was also noted by G.E. Katanaev.

3. 1829, October – in Kokchetav district the detachment of Cossack Kulikov killed 37 women, 45 children, and 22 men of the civilian population. Cossacks took almost all cattle: the Governor-General of Western Siberia recognized that Kulikov's actions were characterized by cruelty. He urgently sent Lieutenant Colonel Nabokov to the victims in the steppe. However, the movement of his detachment cast panic and fear on the nomads [12].

4. 1837 – in Akmola district was sent esaul Chirikov with 60 Cossacks in order to keep the Kazakhs from joining Kenesary Kasymov. In addition, a hundred detachments headed by Simanov were sent from Aktau fortification. The two detachments should have jointly defeated Kenesary, but the goal was not achieved.

5. 1837, December – Kenesary attacked the detachment of Officer Rytov. Rytov was killed, and the rest of the Cossacks were saved from death by Simanov who arrived on the scene [13].

6. 1838, February-March 13 – Kenesary attacked a detachment of Cossacks. Cossacks led by Simanov retaliated. However, military action had no significant results, except that 43 rebels were killed and their cattle and belongings were taken away [14]. Kenesary's horse was killed, but he evaded pursuit [15].

7. 1838, May – Kenesary's siege of Akmola fortress, which had the shape of a square with 5 bastions. Esaul Chirikov, afraid of the rebels, failed to disperse them, for which he was reprimanded by Colonel Talyzin [16].

8. 1838, June 22 – Kenesary attacked the Aktau fortification. Cannon and gunshots were directed at the rebels and they failed to attack the fortification. They took the cattle near Ulytau and fled into the mountains. Then the rebels attacked the Ayaguz fortification. Two detachments came out against Kenesary: on the one hand, centurion Kudryavtsev, on the other hand, on July 6, Simanov with a detachment of 384 Cossacks, 56 outriders, and 5 officers. Near the Ulytau mountains, the Cossacks were attacked by the rebels led by Koshek and Kenesary Kasymov. Kenesary entered into negotiations with Simanov and tried to make peace. He demanded to stop the construction of Russian fortifications on Kazakh land. However, this demand was not satisfied [17].

9. 1839, March-June – organized a large detachment to Zharkain-Agash consisting of 655 Cossacks under the command of Colonel Gorsky of the General Staff. The purpose, as formulated in official documents of that time, was to destroy the gang of the known rebel Kenesary Kasymov [18]. The Cossacks failed to capture Kenesary. In his defense, Gorsky wrote that Kenesary had herds of the best horses, which allowed him to easily escape. But this was not the main reason for the unsuccessful results of the expedition. The Kazakh sultan was saved by excellent knowledge of the terrain, and skillful use of a variety of tactics [19].

10. 1839, July-August – Kenesary attacks the Khan's picket of Kokchetav district and prepares to attack the district order. Adjutant of the Guards' Staff Captain Spiridonov is sent against Kenesary. With a detachment of 200 Cossacks, he went against the rebels from Zharkain but failed to overtake them. In August Gorsky went to the river Sary-Kengir, where Kenesary supposedly roamed, but even there he did not find him and returned to Zharkain-Agash [20].

11. 1839, August – a new detachment of 200 Cossacks was sent against Kenesary under the command of the centurion Volkov. He also did not achieve the main goal - the capture of Kenesary.

12. 1840, June – five detachments were formed against the rebels. The first one was under the leadership of Centurion Volkov. He was to create and strengthen the pickets between Zharkain and Kokchetav. The second detachment of 300 Cossacks was sent under the leadership of Captain Spiridonov to Atbasar to build a picket there. The third detachment of 100 Cossacks was sent to protect the Kokchetav and Akmola districts from Kenesary's invasion. The third detachment also from 300 Cossacks under the command of Serdyukov and Lebedev was sent to the limits of Akmola district to punish unruly Kazakhs and prevent them from going to Kenesary [21]. The fourth detachment from Karkarala district of 150 Cossacks with centurion Kudryavtsev, was to cover the order from the attack of rebels and assist other detachments. The fifth detachment was sent to the Ayaguz district under the command of Centurion Algazin of 100 men [22].

Volkov at the river Togaily-Zhilanshik found traces of Kenesary. June 19 attacked the auls of Kenesary, who retreated to the sands of Kara-Kum. Pursuing those who left, "the Cossacks in 2 platoons, overtaking the Kirghiz, mercilessly beat them", as a result of which 50 people were killed [9]. In the area of the Karazhar tract, the punishers caught up with Kenesary, but he met them with weapons and did not allow himself to be captured.

13. 1840, August – detachments of Count Tolstoy and Major Gayus were sent against the rebels, who wounded people, seized their cattle, but also returned with nothing [23].

14. 1843, June – P. Gorchakov, governor-general of Western Siberia, agreed with V. Obruchev, governor of Orenburg, on joint participation in a large-scale expedition against Kenesary. Obruchev formed a detachment of 300 men, which left the Orsk fortress. The command was entrusted to Lebedev. On Lake Akkol he planned to join the Siberian Cossacks. But on the Irgiz River, Lebedev unexpectedly encountered Kenesary Kasymov and, frightened of him, retreated. Kenesary attacked auls, subordinate to the tsarist government shelty, branches of tleu, who did not recognize him as Khan.

15. 1843 – P. Gorchakov sent a new punitive expedition of about 2,000 men. The command was entrusted to Colonel Bizyanov of the Ural Cossack Army. Sultans of the Middle Juz: Baimukhamed Aishuakov and Arslan Zhantorin were involved in helping him. They were to assist in the capture of Kenesary. The capture of the Kazakh sultan became a matter of state importance. The head of Kenesary was promised a reward – of 3000 rubles, which was a considerable sum [24]. To assist Bizyanov from the Siberian line an auxiliary detachment of Colonel Krivonogov of 250 Cossacks acts, but also without success.

16. 1843, September – in the direction of Lake Ush-kol, the river Kargaly, and the sands of Kara-Kum there was a new battle. Many followers of Kenesary were captured. Bizyanov did not pursue further, as the detachment was weakened and could not continue moving. Bizyanov moved slowly, often wandered in the steppe, and constantly changed routes. Kenesary realized the weakness of his army in front of Bizyanov's army equipped with cannons, so he undertook a

military tactic: the method of maneuvering. Evading an open clash, he forced the Cossacks to chase him. Having engaged in a small skirmish, the khan began to leave suddenly, which extremely exhausted the Cossacks pursuing him.

17. 1843 – the border chief of the Siberian Kirghiz Faletsky formed several additional detachments, the general command of which was entrusted to Esaul Rybin. Faletsky personally arrived in Akmola to control the situation, but the Cossacks failed to capture Kenesary Kasymov, because he retreated to the river Kargaly-Kaidaul, within the Orenburg department.

18. 1844, February – a detachment of Cossacks with the detachment leader Smirnov defeated Kenesary's aul. Kenesary's wife Kunumzhan and 30 other people were captured [25].

19. 1844 – a new attack on the rebels, organized jointly by the Orenburg and West Siberian commands. A powerful Cossack offensive against the rebels was organized from three points: from the fortress Orsk, from the Ulytau mountains, and from the Tobol River. Having united at Torgay, these detachments planned to defeat Kenesary Kasymov. The first detachment of 1600 men under the command of Lebedev set out from Orsk on May 5, 1844, Lebedev found Kenesary, but could not catch up with him. The Khan, constantly changing routes, directed the Cossacks on a false trail. Lebedev did not stop their pursuit, which finally exhausted his detachment. On the way back the detachment of Cossacks brutally defeated the aul of the bay of the Tabyn family Baikadimov, a man loyal to Tsarism, for which Lebedev was dismissed from his duties and brought to the military court. E. Bekmakhanov notes that Lebedev's dismissal, a man who knew the specifics of steppe warfare, had negative consequences. Unlike other detachment chiefs who underestimated Kenesary Kasymov, Lebedev was the only person who saw the khan as an experienced and dangerous opponent. He applied new, more maneuverable methods of fighting with Kenesary. For example, Lebedev for the first time in the history of Russian campaigns in Asia refused slow-moving camel wagons, using light wagons for transportation of ammunition [26].

Lebedev's place is taken by the commander of the 3rd Orenburg regiment Colonel Dunikovsky.

The second detachment acts from the Ulytau fortress. The command is entrusted to Major-General Zhemchuzhnikov. Kenesary Kasymov again applied the tactics of disorientation of the enemy and quite successfully: a small detachment sent by him to meet Zhemchuzhnikov misled the Cossacks. Then Kenesary attacked the Konstantinovskaya fortress of the New Line. At the end of July 1844 Zhemchuzhnikov and Dunikovsky united and headed down the right bank of the Turgai River to jointly pursue the rebels. Dunikovsky and Zhemchuzhnikov were ordered to suppress Kenesary's rebellion by any means. But Zhemchuzhnikov decided to turn back, believing that it was pointless to follow him.

20. 1844, September – a detachment of 300 Cossacks under the command of Lieutenant-Colonel Kovalevsky was sent out, but he returned with nothing.

21. 1845, March – on the river Toktugur a centurion detachment from Kushmurun and Kokchetav districts under the command of Vaganov acts. One more team of 4 outriders and 50 Cossacks with centurion Cheremnov is sent from the reserve of the left flank of the line to the Lepsu River to observe the nomadic volosts. Construction of two fortifications on the rivers Irgiz and Torgai, occupied by strong military commands forced Khan to leave his native lands. Kenesary retreated to the Elder Juz, but even here the tsarist authorities actively pursued him.

22. 1846, March-April – Ayaguz order sent a detachment of Siberian Cossacks of 100 men under the command of Esaul Kazachinin. On August 12, 1846, to strengthen Kazachinin's detachment the Governor-General of Western Siberia sent a detachment of Siberian Cossacks under the command of centurion Nyukhalov. In July 1846 Gorchakov sent from Semipalatinsk an additional detachment of 120 Cossacks and 12 non-commissioned officers under the command of centurion Abakumov against the rebels.

Nyukhalov, having arrived in Kokterek, took under his command the detachment of Cossack Kazachinin. Nyukhalov's detachment remained in the steppe for the whole winter and was fortified by 125 Cossacks under the command of centurion Karbyshev. Nyukhalov himself proposed to send several attachments to suppress the uprising. The first – 350 Cossacks with 3 guns of horse artillery should act from Karatal, and the second - in the same composition should move from Aktau to the river Chu and go to Lake Balkhash. The third – 150 men should be sent from Karkarala along the western side of Lake Balkhash to the confluence of the Ili River. The necessity of equipping these military formations Nyukhalov justified by the fact that the detachment under him is suitable only for the protection of districts from the invasion of Kenesary or his expulsion from the limits of the Elder Juz, but not for the final defeat [27].

23. 1847, March-April – at the foot of mountains Kekli (near Bishkek) the last battle of Khan Kenesary with detachments of Abakumov and Nyukhalov took place. Another detachment of Kirghiz manapas, equipped with funds of the Kokand's khan, arrived at the battle site. Near Tokmak he was captured and died.

As the given chronology of military actions shows, Russian tsarism used Cossacks in the suppression of the national liberation movement of the Kazakh people. In the first half of the XIX century, the Siberian Cossacks were the main punitive force in the movement of Sultan Sarzhan and Khan Kenesara Kasymov. At the late stage of the movement, the Siberian Cossacks used the military force of the Orenburg Cossacks.

The struggle of punishers with nomadic Kazakhs had the character of steppe warfare. In the steppe war of Sarzhan (1824-1836) and Kenesara Kasymov (1837-1847) with the Cossacks for a long time, the tsarist troops failed to achieve the main task - the elimination of the leaders of the rebellion. The military forces and the level of military training of the Cossacks were high, sometimes with firearms, and shells; the presence of professional military equipment gave them an undeniable superiority. Also in the conditions of openness of the steppe, and lack of natural obstacles, such as forests, hills, and mountains, the Cossacks had the opportunity to widely use firearms in all directions and long distances.

Nevertheless, the high level of military skill of steppe Kazakhs allowed them for a long time, namely, for almost a quarter of a century, from 1824 to 1847, to resist the Cossacks, preventing them from capturing the leaders of the protest, thus stopping the movement. Analysis of historical materials shows that none of the detachments sent after the rebellious sultans, and as shown above, there was a large number of them, did not fulfill the main mission - the elimination of Sarzhan and Kenesary. This was facilitated by the Kazakhs' excellent knowledge of the terrain, use of different military tactics, skillful use of weapons, strict military discipline, and other factors.

Conclusion

Thus, military actions during the movement of Sultan Sarzhan and Khan Kenesary between Kazakhs and punishers can be characterized as an example of a "steppe war". The Cossacks actively pursued the leaders of the uprising and tried to stop the unrest at any cost. The analysis of the historical material above shows that these were military clashes between two opposing sides. On the one hand - local nomads, on the other – the colonial power in the form of tsarist troops.

In the struggle against the uprisings of the Kazakh people against Russian colonialism, tsarism widely used the power of military weapons in the person of the Cossacks, who were represented by such troops as the Siberian, Ural, Orenburg, and Semirechensk troops. The military confrontation between Cossacks and nomads during the "Steppe War" had its specific features. First, the main role in the "steppe war" was played by the natural-geographical factor. Therefore, the campaigns of punishers were planned for the spring-summer period. It can be called a natural-cyclic way of struggle against the steppes. Secondly, the punitive detachments were lightweight, i.e. they were recruited taking into account that they could easily move in open areas.

However, the implementation of methods and tactics of the "steppe war" did not allow the punishers to suppress the rebellion of Kazakhs led by Sarzhan and Kenesary. Only in 1836, as a

result of Sarzhan's death at the hands of the Kokands' ruler, and in 1847, as a result of Kenesary's tragic death at the hands of Kyrgyz manaps, was it possible to stop the struggle of the masses for their independence.

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«ДАЛА СОҒЫСЫ» (САРЖАН МЕН КЕНЕСАРЫ ҚАСЫМҰЛДАРЫ БАСТАҒАН ҚАЗАҚТАРДЫҢ ҰЛТ-АЗАТТЫҚ ҚОЗҒАЛЫСЫ МЫСАЛЫНДА)

Андатпа

Осы мақалада автор сұлтан Саржан мен хан Кенесары Қасымұлдарының (1824-1847) басшылығымен болған қазақ халқының ұлт-азаттық қозғалысы кезіндегі дала соғысының проблемалары қарастырылады. Автор «дала соғысы» терминін, оның семантикалық мағынасы мен ерекшеліктерін зерттеуге тырысты. Сондай-ақ, XIX ғасырдың бірінші жартысындағы қазақ халқының әскери өнерін талдай отырып, дала соғысының айырмашылықтары, әскери өнердің ерекшеліктері зерттелді. Орта жүз аумағы қазақ халқының өз тәуелсіздігін қалпына келтіру үшін патша әскерлеріне қарсылық білдіріп, ашық түрде қарсы шыққан қимылдарының негізгі театрына айналды. Дала соғысы тәжірибесі арқылы Абылай ханның есімдері аңызға айналған немерелерінің наразылық қозғалысы кезінде орын алған басты оқиғаларды негізінен Орта жүз

The "Steppe war" (on the example of the national liberation movement of Kazakhs led by Sarzhan and Kenesary Kasymovs)

аумағында байқауға болады. Бұл ормандар, таулар түрінде табиғи баспаналардың болмауымен сипатталатын дала аумақтары. Сондай-ақ, бұл кезең тек табиғи-географиялық факторлардың ғана емес, сонымен қатар өндірістік кәсіпорындар, өндірістік объектілер сияқты әлеуметтік-экономикалық факторлардың болуымен сипатталады. Осы тақырыпты зерттеу арқылы қазақтардың әскери тактикасы мен қару-жарағының кейбір ерекшеліктерін де қарастыруға болады. Қазақ халқының барлық ұлт-азаттық күресі: көтерілістері мен қозғалыстары әскери қарудың күшімен басылғаны белгілі.

Негізгі сөздер: дала соғысы, әскери тарих, Саржан, Кенесары, қазақтар, ұлт-азаттық қозғалыс.

«СТЕПНАЯ ВОЙНА» (НА ПРИМЕРЕ НАЦИОНАЛЬНО-ОСВОБОДИТЕЛЬНОГО ДВИЖЕНИЯ КАЗАХОВ ПОД ПРЕДВОДИТЕЛЬСТВОМ САРЖАНА И КЕНЕСАРЫ КАСЫМОВЫХ)

Аннотация

В настоящей статье рассматриваются проблемы степной войны в период национально-освободительного движения казахского народа под предводительством султана Саржана и хана Кенесары Касымовых (1824-1847). Автором рассмотрен термин «степная война», его смысловое значение и особенности. Также на примере военного искусства казахского народа в первой половине XIX столетия изучена специфика степной войны, особенности военного искусства. Территория Среднего жуза стала основным театром боевых действий в период выступления казахского народа против царских войск за восстановление своей независимости. Через опыт степной войны можно проследить основные события, имевшие место в годы протестного движения легендарных внуков хана Абылая преимущественно на территории Среднего жуза. Это степные территории, для которых было характерно отсутствие природных укрытий в виде лесов, гор. Также для указанного периода характерно отсутствие не только природно-географических факторов, но и социально-экономических, таких, как производственные предприятия, промышленные объекты. Посредством исследования данной темы также можно рассмотреть некоторые вопросы военных тактик, вооружения казахов. Как известно, все национально-освободительные выступления казахского народа подавлялись силой военного оружия. Этой силой выступило казачество.

Ключевые слова: степная война, военная история, Саржан, Кенесары, казачество, национально-освободительное движение.

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