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THE ROLE OF I. STALIN AS A DIRECT LEADER AND ORGANIZER OF REPRESSIONS OF THE 1930 S

Abstract.

The role of I. Stalin during the period of political repressions of the 1930 s is investigated. On specific documents signed by Stalin and stored in archives, his role as a direct organizer and direct leader of repressions is shown, who daily delved into all issues, up to the most detailed, the organization of the work of the leading party bodies and bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs on the implementation of the politics of terror and violence. I. Stalin kept the work of carrying out repressions under his personal unremitting control, often gave direct instructions to the leadership of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs on individual cases, on specific people. It is shown that Stalin directed not only the operational-investigative, investigative activities of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but also the preparation and conduct of trials. So, Stalin personally painted the entire organization of the "Process of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist center" in January 1937 in Moscow. Stalin's personal involvement and direct leadership was manifested not only in the organization of political repression, but also in the implementation of economic policy, which was a policy of subjugation of the population through actual economic strangulation. This is shown by the example of the famine (asharshylyk) of 1931-1933 in Kazakhstan.

Key words: repressions, People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, I. Stalin, N. Yezhov, investigation.

Introduction.

The relevance of the topic is explained by the fact that to this day a significant number of supporters of Stalin's views remain in society, including in the scientific community (N.D. Kolesov, G.A. Cheremisinov, G.I. Khanin, Yu.N. Zhukov, etc.) [1], [2]. These researchers explain the collapse of the socialist model in the USSR and the countries of Eastern Europe by a departure from the ways of development declared by Stalin. A similar trend increases every time before the next Stalinist date [3], [4]. In studies devoted to the period of the "Great Terror", there are opinions about the heads of the United State Political Administration - the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, G.G. Yagoda and N.I. Yezhov, as the main organizers of political repression and, accordingly, as the main culprits of these criminal actions [5], [6]. Such a point of view could not fail to manifest itself even in the name of this gloomy period, as "yehovshchina". However, this would be profoundly wrong [7], [8]. As noted by domestic and foreign researchers: "Numerous documents that have been discovered in recent years, including published correspondence, indicate that it was Stalin who was the main inspirer and organizer of the policy of terror and violence" [9]. For example, a few hours after receiving the news of the murder of S.M. Kirov on December 1, 1934, Stalin personally prepared a resolution of the Central Executive Committee of the USSR "On the procedure for conducting cases on the preparation or commission of terrorist acts". According

to the resolution of the Central Executive Committee, the investigation must conduct the cases of those accused of terrorism in an expedited manner, within ten days, with immediate execution of the sentence. The indictment was handed over the day before the trial, the presence of a lawyer was excluded, the possibility of appeal was excluded, the meeting was held in closed mode. This law, according to some authors, created the legal basis for the "Great Terror" [10].

Materials and methods of research.

The materials of the collection "Lubyanka. Stalin and the Main Directorate of State Security of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. Stalin's archive. Documents of the highest bodies of party and state power. 1937-1938", documents of the Archive of the President of the Russian Federation, materials of scientific articles. The methodology of the study was based on the methods of historical, comparative, and legal analysis. During the research, methods of historical logic, analysis and synthesis, clarification of cause-and-effect relationships, comparison and comparison of events and facts were also applied.

Results and its discussion.

Stalin was the absolute leader not only of the party, but, in fact, of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (PCIA), the organizer and direct leader of repression, who daily delved into all issues, up to the most detailed, the organization of the work of the leading party bodies and bodies of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs to implement the policy of terror and violence. Stalin can be called the most effective leader and professional employee of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs of the USSR. None of the leaders involved in the implementation of the policy of repression worked as systematically and as effectively as Stalin. It can be said that here all the organizational and mental abilities of Stalin were most fully revealed. Thus, he comprehensively prepared, organized and carried out the "Great Terror" on a large scale, and when the "Great Terror" fulfilled its goals and objectives, it was curtailed by Stalin at the right moment. Stalin had an outstanding natural mind, possessed incredible efficiency, and this manifested itself, however, in the most negative way, starting in 1934, and especially in 1937-1939.

It can be noted that Stalin kept the work of repression under his unflagging attention and control. He often gave direct instructions to the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs leadership on individual cases, on specific people. So, having received the protocol of the interrogation of S.H. Khodzhanov (italics of auth.) dated July 31, 1937, he writes: "Take Dzhandosova (italics of auth.)" [11].

Stalin proved himself to be a meticulous investigator, and as an experienced investigator, he often found inconsistencies in the case. So, on the special message of L.P. Beria dated April 13, 1939, he makes notes: "Conspired?", "You're lying!", "Roshal should be broken off", "What others?" [12].

This can be explained by the fact that Stalin's skill and knowledge of all the intricacies of the hardware behind-the-scenes political struggle, which he mastered perfectly, and the skills of investigating cause-and-effect relationships, which were also inherent in Stalin, merged here.

In general, investigative actions and investigative work were inherent in the Bolshevik Party from the first days of its creation. Before 1917, investigations were often conducted among party members after the arrest or the failures of underground organizations to find provocateurs and police agents. Even party courts were arranged. The tradition of investigative work was preserved and developed after the Bolsheviks seized power in October 1917. Even the positions of party investigators were established in the Communist Party. A party investigator is a full-time vacant position at the control commissions of party committees, as well as at the Central Control Commission (CCC) The Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union

(SCBCPSU) (b), which was engaged in control work, conducting party purges, analyzing the personal affairs of communists. Actions almost close to the investigation were also organized during party purges, which were very frequent, only three general party purges were carried out (1921, 1929-1930, 1933), not counting local ones. That is, the Bolsheviks had a lot of experience in investigative work.

Stalin tried not to miss anything, delved into all the subtleties. Often a huge flow of incoming cases even overwhelmed him, among the cases there were petty cases, such as, for example, the case of the aircraft technician Korolev. On February 20, 1938, Stalin wrote a note to L.Z. Mehlis about the case of the aircraft technician Korolev: "T. Mehlis. This case was examined in detail with the challenge of Korolev. Led the case of T. Yezhov. They could not get anything intelligible from Korolev (he turned out to be not quite normal). The case is considered liquidated" [11. – 302].

After October 18, 1937, having received the protocol of the interrogation of the first secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party (b) of Belarus Ya.A. Yakovlev, Stalin poses specific questions to the People's Commissariat of Internal affairs investigators: "1) Did he know about Vareikis' service in the tsarist okhrana. 2) His opinion about Mikhailov from Voronezh and his participation in the K.R. (counter-revolutionary - auth.) organization. 3) His connection with Trotsky (I saw him personally in 1935 or 1934). 4) How did he want to use the International Organization of Assistance to the Fighters of the Revolution? Who did he use from the International Organization of Assistance to the Fighters of the Revolution? 5) To take Yakovlev's wife into circulation: he is a conspirator and must tell everything. Ask her about Stasova, Kirsanova and her other close friends" [11. – 303].

At the special communication of N.I. Yezhov (after October 18, 1937) Stalin writes the following resolution: "Vol. Yezhov. Which Mikhailov? Even the name and patronymic were not asked... Investigators are good. It is not the past activities of Yakovlev and Sokolovskaya that are important to us, but their wrecking and espionage work over the last year, the last months of 1937. We also need to know why both scoundrels went abroad almost every year" [11. – 304].

Stalin sees the task of the investigator not in establishing the truth and all the circumstances of the case, but in collecting everything that will serve as the basis for a guilty verdict. So, on June 29, 1940, he wrote to L.P. Beria in response to his special report on the case of N.S. Angarsky: "What is the role of the investigator? Is he a listener to the narrator Angarsky, and only?" [12. – 42].

I.V. Stalin's direct instructions to the employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs are often followed. So, on September 13, 1937, Stalin wrote: "1) Zinoviev should be summoned and arrested ... 3) Beaten (here and further emphasis and italics, except for the author's, Stalin): Unschrift for not giving out agents of Poland in the regions (Orenburg, Novosibirsk, etc.). 5) Arrest Volkov" [11. – 305].

Let's pay attention to Stalin's words "beat up". By this time, since 1937, the Central Committee had been instructed to apply physical measures against "enemies of the people" [12. – 43]. And Stalin very often uses this word in his instructions to the employees of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs.

On September 2, 1938, N.I. Yezhov sent a special message to I.V. Stalin about a terrorist group in the rubber industry. On the first sheet there are handwritten notes of Stalin: "NB (nota bene – pay attention – auth.). Walter (German)" and "NB. (beat Walter)" [11. – 306].

March 13, 1938, direct instructions from I.V. Stalin about the methods of conducting interrogations: "1) Beat Ryabinin to the fullest, why did not he betray Vareikis. 2) Press on Paskutsky about issuing a Left Socialist-Revolutionary group (possibly Belov and others)" [11. – 307].

On January 17, 1938, Stalin wrote a note to N.I. Yezhov. This note is more like a direct instruction on a specific case: "...1. The line of SRS (left and right together) is not unwound. Fishman, Paskutsky are making fool of People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs. If Belov himself had not unwound along the line of the SRS, the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs would have been sitting in the dark. Belov said some things, but he didn't say everything. Paskutsky, Uritsky and Fishman should complement Belov. It should be borne in mind that we have a lot of social revolutionaries in our army and outside the army. Does the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (PCIA) have a record of social revolutionaries ("former") in the army? I would like to get it as soon as possible. Does the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (PCIA) have a record of "former" Social revolutionaries outside the army (in civilian institutions)? I would also like to receive it in 2-3 weeks. 2. What has been done to identify the SRS based on the well-known testimony of Ryskulov (italics of auth.)? 3. What has been done to identify and arrest all Iranians in Baku and Azerbaijan? 4. I inform you for orientation that at one time the SRS were very strong in Saratov, in Tambov, in Ukraine, in the army (command staff), in Tashkent and in general in Central Asia, at Baku power plants, where they are still sitting and harming the oil industry. We need to act more quickly and more clearly..." [11. – 308].

Stalin seeks not to let the tension ease in exposing the "enemies of the people", counter-revolutionary elements, pests of agriculture and industry. To this end, he proposes to organize open demonstration processes in each area. Stalin's telegram is sent to the secretaries of regional committees, regional committees of the Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party of the USSR (b), Central Committee of the National Communist Parties: "Recently, in the territories, regions and republics, the wrecking work of enemies of the people in the field of agriculture has been revealed, aimed at undermining the economy of collective farms and provoking collective farmers to discontent against the Soviet government through a whole system of mockery and mockery of them.

The Central Committee considers a significant drawback of the management of the destruction of pests in agriculture to be the fact that the elimination of pests is carried out only in a closed manner through the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs (PCIA) organs, and collective farmers are not mobilized to combat sabotage and its carriers. Considering the political mobilization of collective farmers around the work carried out to defeat the enemies of the people in agriculture absolutely necessary, the Central Committee of the (b) obliges regional committees, regional committees and the Central Committee of national parties to organize 2-3 open demonstration trials in each region by districts over the enemies of the people – agricultural pests who have made their way into the district party, Soviet and land bodies (workers MTS and raizo, predRIKs, secretaries of the Republic of Kazakhstan, etc.), widely covering the course of the trials in the local press" [11. – 309].

In November 1936, Stalin wrote on the protocol of the interrogation of G.Ya. Sokolnikov, the former People's Commissar of Finance, then the plenipotentiary in the UK: "And yet he reported on the plan to kill the leaders of the Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party? Of course, he reported...Sokolnikov, of course, gave Talbot information about the USSR, about the Central Committee, about the GPU, about everything. Sokolnikov, therefore, was an informant (spy-scout) of British intelligence" [13]. The very fact of working in the UK for Stalin already meant a connection with British intelligence and that Sokolnikov was a spy. From a letter from I.V. Stalin to L.M. Kaganovich about the case of A.S. Nakhaev (Chief of Staff of the osoaviakhim Artillery Division): "4) The Nakhaev case is a bastard case. He, of course (of course!) not alone. It is necessary to pin him to the wall, force him to tell the whole truth and then punish him severely. He

must be a Polish German (or Japanese) agent. Hello I.St." [9. – 718]. In this case, Stalin directly asserts that Nakhaev is a spy, however, leaving either German, Polish, or Japanese in question.

Stalin does not ignore any, even insignificant, message about the enemies of the people. So, on April 13, 1937, a letter from a certain Moshkova to I.V. Stalin about Trotskyist conspirators falls on his desk. After reading it, Stalin writes: "Comrade. Yezhov, it is possible that Moshkova's confused letter contains some truth. Send a person from the CPC to Moshkova plus one from the PCIA and instruct both to find out the case. We need to find out: who is Kiselyova, Alexandrov, Lapidus, Bennett, local Trotskyists in Kursk. It would be good to carry out this case without involving Emets. I. Stalin" [11. – 310].

Under Stalin's strict control were all affairs, even the sectarian Germans of the Volga region. This is evidenced by the cipher telegram of I.V. Stalin to A.A. Andreev about the arrests of Volga Germans in the republic on August 2, 1937: "Saratov, T. ANDREEV, a copy to T. YEZHOF. The Central Committee decided: First. To authorize the seizure of the leaders of the sectarian German group beth Brudorovtsev. Second. The current composition of the security officers in the ASSR of the Volga Germans is not replaced by Germans. You can leave for Moscow on August 3" [11. – 311].

Stalin does not lose sight of the issues of the struggle against the former kulaks. On August 20, 1937, together with V.M. Molotov, he signed a note on increasing the limit on the Kulak operation for the Krasnoyarsk Territory: "To give the Krasnoyarsk Territory an additional 6,600 people. limit for the 1st category. "For" I. St., V. Molotov" [11. – 312].

At N.I. Yezhov's special message dated August 27, 1937, with a copy of G.S. Lyushkov's telegram about the doctors-conspirators attached, I.V. Stalin makes a note in the margins: "For arrest. St." [11. – 313].

On November 3, 1937, N.I. Yezhov sent a special message to I.V. Stalin with an appendix of the protocol of P.T. Zubarev's interrogation. On the first sheet there is a handwritten litter of Stalin: "Zubarev is a security guard. Include in the list" [11. – 314].

Stalin's revenge on his opponents was boundless and knew no bounds. On the special message of N.I. Yezhov and L.P. Beria about the arrests of the wives of traitors to the motherland on October 15, 1938, Stalin puts a handwritten note: "T-sham Yezhov and Beria. That's right. I. Stalin" [11. – 315].

On August 29, 1937, the first secretary of the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU (b), A.Ya. Stolyar sent a cipher telegram to I.V. Stalin about the need to arrest the head of construction of Uralmash Vladimirova: "In order to effectively implement your instructions in the construction of Uralmash, the implementation of the defense plan, we consider it absolutely necessary to remove and arrest Vladimirova, thereby preventing the possibility of major sabotage at the plant. We have indisputable data about Vladimirova's work in German intelligence." There is a handwritten resolution on the cipher telegram: "To Comrade Carpenter. I propose to immediately arrest Vladimirova. I. Stalin" [11. – 316]. And on November 14, 1937, Stalin still sends a cipher telegram to the Sverdlovsk Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) about expanding the rights of the troika: "Run through the troika of the case of acts of sabotage on the Kaganovich Road with the use of execution against the perpetrators" [11. – 317].

Stalin keeps under unflagging control the course of both "national operations" and the search for "enemies of the people" in the army. On September 14, 1937, Stalin received a special message from N.I. Yezhov about the course of the "Polish" operation. On the first sheet there are handwritten

notes of Stalin: "From T. Yezhov"; *T. Yezhov*. Very good! Dig and clean up this Polish-spy dirt from now on. Destroy it in the *interests of the USSR*. I. Stalin. 14/I*X-37 g.*" [11. – 318].

On the first sheet of a special message from N.I. Yezhov to I.V. Stalin with a copy of a telegram from Ya.A. Deitch about a counterrevolutionary organization among the military in the Azov-Black Sea Region dated September 24, 1937, there is a handwritten litter of Stalin: "Yezhov. Pay attention. We need to arrest Fin, Akatov. It is necessary to excavate the Glavkonupr (the Main Directorate of Horse Breeding – auth.)" [11. – 319].

On December 5, 1937, N.I. Yezhov sent a special message to I.V. Stalin with an appendix of the protocol of the interrogation of B.M. Tal, who worked as the head of the Press and Publishing Department of the Central Committee of the Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union (b). On the first sheet there is a resolution of Stalin: "To T. Malenkov. Read it together with T. Mehlis and get Yezhov to arrest all the scoundrels mentioned in the testimony of the scoundrel Tal." There are also notes of Stalin opposite individual surnames "Where is he?", "Where are they?", "Arrest" [11. – 320].

Stalin does not hesitate in his expressions, describing the arrested "enemies of the people." So, he writes on the message of L.P. Beria dated April 27, 1939: "Weinberg is a bastard. Metalikov = scoundrel" [13. – 67].

On April 3, 1938, Stalin received a special message from N.I. Yezhov with a copy of a telegram from the People's Commissar of Internal Affairs of Kazakhstan (italics auth.) S.F. Redens about the participants of the Pravotrotskyist center. On the text of the special message there are handwritten notes of Stalin: on the first sheet "Important", in the margins opposite the surname there is a litter: "Ask Chaplin", "Ask Bekzadyan", "Ask Sverdlov and Kiselyov" [11. – 321].

There is a special message from N.I. Yezhov to I.V. Stalin dated March 30, 1938, with a copy of a telegram from the head of the PCIA (People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs) Department of the Novosibirsk Region, G.F. Gorbach, on the progress of the investigation of the region's top officials. One surname is circled and there is a litter of Stalin in the margins: "Why hasn't Kurganov been arrested?" On the first sheet there is a handwritten litter and Stalin's resolution: "What about Sergeyev? Arrest Kurganov immediately" [11. – 322].

Stalin shows no pity for people. During the war, people experienced great hardships due to the lack of food and goods. There has been an increase in thefts of food and industrial goods. In this regard, the Secretary of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Uzbekistan U.Y. Yusupov and the People's Commissar of the PCIA A.Z. Kobulov appealed to Stalin with a proposal to create a "Troika" – an extraordinary repressive judicial body. Stalin writes on a note: "The robbers are not just thieves, but enemies of the state. I'm for the offer...I insist on my proposal" [12. – 44]. "Troika" was created and according to its decision 50 people were shot [14].

Stalin supervised not only the operational search and investigative activities of the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs, but also the preparation and conduct of trials. This was very important for the Stalinist leadership: during the investigation, not only to obtain confessions of the accused, but also to formalize the court case accordingly in order to achieve not only the political and moral destruction of the enemy, and then physical, but also to consolidate the point of view of the Stalinist leadership among the population of the country on the repressed as "enemies of the people", in order to strengthen their power in the state. For example, on January 22, 1937, the Politburo of the Central Committee of the Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party (SCBCP) (b) adopted a resolution "On the trial of Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, etc." It defined: "1) In the press to name the process: "The process of the anti-Soviet Trotskyist Center." 2) Exclude Stikling and Leonenko from the list of witnesses. 3) Start the process on January 23, 1937, at 12

o'clock in the afternoon. 4) Approve the following composition of the court: Chairman: Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR - Comrade. Ulrich; Members of the court: Deputy Chairman of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR – Comrade. Matulevich I.O. and a member of the Military Collegium of the Supreme Court of the USSR – Comrade. Rychkov N.M. 5) Conduct the process in the October Hall of the House of Unions. 6) To admit ambassadors of foreign states, or their substitutes, if the latter express a desire to attend the process. 7) To admit foreign correspondents of the bourgeois and communist press to the trial. 8) Allow correspondents from the following newspapers to attend the process: Pravda, Izvestia, Komsomolskaya Pravda, (The list of 13 regional newspapers follows.) ... "Deutsche Central Zeitung", "Journal de Moscou", "Moskau Daily News". 9) To call as witnesses to the trial: Stein, Bukhartsev, Roma, Loginov, and Tamm. 10) Summon the following experts to the process: engineer-geologist Lekus for Kuzbass; chairman of the investigative expert commission – engineer-technologist Pokrovsky for the Kemerovo Chemical Plant. 11) Establish the following order of interrogation of the accused at the trial: Pyatakov, Radek, Sokolnikov, Serebryakov, Drobnis, Muralov, Boguslavsky, Norkin, Shestov, Stroilov, Livshits, Knyazev, Turk, Rataychak, Grache, Pushchin, Arnold. 12) Accept Comrade's offer. Tal about the procedure for covering the process in print (see appendix). 13) To allow representatives of workers, collective farmers, and intellectuals from different regions of the Soviet Union to attend the trial with special passes. The personal composition of those present should be determined by T.T. Andreev and Yezhov. 14) Do not object to the presence of foreign writers Feuchtwanger and Andersen Nexé at the trial. 15) To invite T.T. Stetsky, Tal and Vyshinsky to publish on behalf of the People's Commissariat of Justice a full verbatim report of the trial in French, German, English and Spanish. The publication period is 5 days after the end of the process" [11. – 323].

All issues have been identified: a list of necessary witnesses, experts, the procedure for questioning the accused. The order of press coverage of the process in the Soviet press was also described in detail and in detail: in which newspapers, how much and what materials to publish. All materials going to the press had to be given with a visa of responsible employees - Stetsky, Tal, Mehlis, Vyshinsky and Agranov. In fact, the entire procedure for conducting (scenario) of the trial was signed in detail to exclude any deviations from it.

Stalin possessed incredible cunning, always sought to hide the truth about the events that took place in the USSR. His remark in a letter to L.M. Kaganovich dated August 23, 1936, about the coverage of the first Moscow political process is indicative.

"It would be necessary to delete the final words: "the verdict is final and not subject to appeal." These words are superfluous and make a bad impression. An appeal should not be allowed, but it is unwise to write about it in the verdict" [9. – 719].

Stalin was distinguished by absolute legal nihilism, disregard for legal norms. There could not even be a question of the basis of justice – the principle of the presumption of innocence. On September 11, 1936, he wrote a letter to L.M. Kaganovich: "It is better to remove Pyatakov from the post of deputy right now, without waiting for the results of the investigation. Stalin]" [9. – 720].

Stalin's personal involvement and direct leadership was manifested not only in the organization of political repression, but also in the implementation of economic policy, which was a policy of total subordination of the population through actual economic strangulation. And it can also be qualified as a form of collective political repression. As you know, industrialization was carried out at the expense of the robbery of the peasantry. As a result of forced collectivization, the state established full control over the peasants, and, accordingly, over grain procurements for the subsequent export of bread abroad. On August 24, 1930, I.V. Stalin wrote to V.M. Molotov about

grain exports: "It would be necessary to raise (now) the rate of daily export to 3-4 million [ion] pounds minimum. Otherwise, we risk being left without our new metallurgical and machine-building (Automobile plant, Chelyabinsk Plant, etc.) plants <....> In short, we need to frantically force the export of bread" [15]. And because of this policy, a mass famine broke out in many territories and regions of the USSR in 1931-1933, on a scale that surpassed even the famine of 1921.

Researchers of the famine (asharshylyk) in Kazakhstan identify the secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the SCBCP (Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union) (b) F.I. Goloshchekin as the main culprit of the tragedy. Without removing the blame from F.I. Goloshchekin, it can be noted that the totalitarian state based on the regime of Stalin's personal power, already established by that time in the USSR, in fact, by its nature, left no option for the entire party-state apparatus, turning them into simple executors of the leader's will. As the American researcher Sarah Cameron notes: "Stalin and Philip Goloshchekin, the first secretary of the Party of Kazakhstan, throughout the famine period, corresponded regularly during these crises, and Stalin was aware of the extent of the damage inflicted on the Kazakhs" [16].

In May 1932, I. Stalin refused the request of the secretary of the Kazakh Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) F.I. Goloshchekin to reduce the grain procurement plan for Kazakhstan due to a decrease in the sown area for grain and import from Siberia that had not passed acclimatization and had reduced seed germination.

Despite the onset of famine, Stalin categorically demanded the implementation of the grain procurement plan, effectively condemning the population of Kazakhstan to starvation. And the document logically following from the above is the directive of I.V. Stalin to F.I. Goloshchekin of November 21, 1932: "To strike first of all at the Communists in the districts and below the districts who are completely in captivity of the petty-bourgeois element and the grain procurements that have rolled onto the rails of Kulak sabotage" [17]. The famine of 1932-1933 claimed the lives of at least 3 million Kazakhs [18]. According to V.P. Danilov's calculations, only the rejection of grain exports in 1932 would have allowed about 7 million people to feed according to the norms of prosperous years. people, exactly as many as, most likely, became victims of the famine in 1933 [19].

Conclusion.

As a conclusion, we can say that such a wide use of the method of repression and Stalin's constant attention to the repressive work of the PCIA can be explained by the fact that the People's Commissariat of Internal Affairs organs were the main pillar of the regime of personal power of the General Secretary of the Central Committee of the Supreme Control Body of the Communist Party(b), which by that time was established in the country. Stalin had all the power not only in the country and in the party, but, in fact, in the PCIA, he was the direct organizer and direct leader of the repressions, who daily delved into all issues, up to the most detailed, the organization of the work of the leading party bodies and PCIA bodies to implement the policy of terror and violence. Because the sole power in a totalitarian state could only be supported by an unrelenting fear of state bodies and constant repression.

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И.СТАЛИННИҢ 1930 ЖЫЛДАРДАҒЫ САЯСИ ҚУҒЫН-СҮРГІНДІ ҰЙЫМДАСТЫРУШЫ ЖӘНЕ ТІКЕЛЕЙ БАСҚАРУШЫ РЕТІНДЕГІ РӨЛІ

Аңдатпа.

Мақалада И.Сталиннің 1930-шы жылдардағы саяси қуғын-сүргін кезіндегі рөлі зерттеледі. Мұрағаттарда сақталған Сталиннің өзі қол қойған нақты құжаттарда оның күнделікті террор мен қысым көрсету саясатын іске асырудағы Ішкі істер халық комиссариаты мен партияның басқарушы органдарының барлық жұмыстарында мәселені егжей-тегжейлі білген ұйымдастырушы және тікелей басқарушы ретіндегі рөлі көрініс табады. И.Сталин саяси қуғын-сүргінді жүргізуді өзінің ерекше жіті бақылауында ұстап, Ішкі істер халық комиссариаты басшылығына жекелеген істер мен жекелеген адамдар мен тұлғалар бойынша тікелей тапсырмалар беріп отырған. Сөйтіп, И.Сталин Ішкі істер халық комиссариатының жедел іздестіру және тергеп-тексеру шараларына жетекшілік жасап қана қоймай, сот процестерінің жүруін дайындау мен өткізуге де араласқанын көреміз. Мысалы, И.Сталин 1937 жылдың қаңтарында Мәскеудегі «Антикеңестік троцкиштілер орталығы» бойынша процесті жүргізуді жеке өзі толықтай ұйымдастырған. Сталиннің тікелей басшылық жасауы мен жеке ұйымдастыруы саяси репрессияларды ұйымдастыруда ғана емес, тұрғындарды экономикалық жағдайды қиындату арқылы бағындыру саясаты болып табылатын экономикалық саясатты жүргізуден де білінеді. Бұл атап айтқанда, 1931-1933 жылдары Қазақстанда болған ашаршылық мысалында нақты көрінеді.

Негізгі сөздер: саяси қуғын-сүргін, Ішкі істер халық комиссариаты, И.Сталин, Н.Ежов, тергеу.

РОЛЬ И. СТАЛИНА КАК НЕПОСРЕДСТВЕННОГО РУКОВОДИТЕЛЯ И ОРГАНИЗАТОРА РЕПРЕССИЙ 1930-ЫХ ГОДОВ

Аннотация.

Исследуется роль И.Сталина в период политических репрессий 1930-ых гг. На конкретных документах, подписанных Сталиным, и хранящихся в архивах, показана его роль как прямого организатора, и непосредственного руководителя репрессий, ежедневно вникавшего во все вопросы, вплоть до самых подробных, организации работы руководящих партийных органов и органов Народного комиссариата внутренних дел о проведении политики террора и насилия. И.Сталин держал работу по проведению репрессий под своим личным особым контролем, часто давал прямые указания руководству НКВД по отдельным делам, по конкретным людям. В статье описано, что Сталин руководил не только оперативно-розыскной, следственной деятельностью НКВД, но и подготовкой, проведением судебных процессов. Так, Сталин лично расписывал всю организацию проведения «Процесса антисоветского троцкистского центра» в январе 1937 года в Москве. Личное участие и прямое руководство Сталина проявлялось не только в организации политических репрессий, но и в проведении экономической политики, являвшейся политикой подчинения населения через фактическое экономическое удушение. Это показано на примере голода 1931-1933 годов в Казахстане.

Ключевые слова: репрессии, Народный комиссариат внутренних дел, И.Сталин, Н.Ежов, следствие.

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ИСТОЧНИКИ ПО ИСТОРИИ ПОВСТАНЧЕСКОГО ДВИЖЕНИЯ В МАНГЫСТАУ В 1931 ГОДУ

Аннотация.

В статье рассматривается источниковая база исследований по истории повстанческого движения в Мангыстау в 1931 году, состоящая из архивных документов и материалов, извлеченных из фондов Архива Президента Республики Казахстан (АПРК), Архива КНБ РК, Государственного архива Мангистауской области (ГАМО), Российского государственного архива политической истории (РГАСПИ), Российского государственного военного архива (РГВА). Представлена развернутая характеристика состава и содержания основных групп источников, определены репрезентативность, характер и специфика входящих в их состав документов и материалов, показана иерархия приоритетности этих групп в корпусе источников для объективного исследования истории повстанческого движения в Мангыстау в 1931 году. Основной группой источников являются документы краевых, региональных и районных органов Объединенного государственного политического управления (ОГПУ), Оренбургский государственный педагогический университет, хранящиеся в архиве КНБ РК Комитет национальной безопасности Республики Казахстан, в